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CASE NOTES
ATTORNEYS-CONTEMPT OF COURT BY ABSENCE
FROM COURTROOM-DIRECT OR INDIRECT
The defendant is an attorney at law who, on April 17, 1964, had
several matters pending in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
After completion of one matter, the defendant was notified of the jury's
return in another case, and he immediately left the court in which another of his cases was to be heard in order to receive the returned verdict
in yet another case. When the second case in the first courtroom was
called, the attorney did not appear. The trial judge cited the defendant
for contempt, and after two hearings on the matter, the contempt order
was made final. The defendant petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme
Court of California held that the defendant's conduct amounted to direct
contempt, and the two-day jail sentence was affirmed. Arthur v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 42 Cal. Rptr. 441, 398 P.2d 367 (1965).
The Supreme Court of California was called upon to decide whether
the defendant's conduct constituted contempt, and if it was, whether
the contempt was direct or indirect, civil or criminal.'
Historically, the power of the courts to punish for contempt dates
back to the early days of England. The purpose of the contempt power
was to assure the "efficiency and dignity of, and the respect for the
governing sovereign."'2 Every contempt of court was considered indirectly a contempt of the King. As time went on, the courts claimed the
contempt power was an inherent right, and it became part of the judicial
process.

In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789' was the first federal
legislation concerning contempt. This act allowed federal courts to "punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all con'4
tempts of authority in any case or hearing before the same." Subsequently, the individual states enacted their own contempt legislation,
and they joined the federal courts in defending the necessity of the
contempt power as an essential means of deterring obstructions to the
administration of justice. In Ex Parte Robinson,5 Justice Field held that
1 The other issue presented in this case is the procedure followed by the court. This
issue will be mentioned only briefly as it does not directly enter in this discussion.
2 GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 9 (1963).

3 Judiciary Act of 1789 S 17, 1 Stat. 83.

41bid.

5 86 U.S. 505 (1873).
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"the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and
consequently to the due administration of justice."6
Contempt of court can be defined as any act which is calculated to
embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or
which is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity. Contempt may be
broken down into four classifications: direct contempt, which is an act
committed in the presence of the court; indirect contempt, or constructive or consequential contempt, which is an act committed outside the
presence of the court; civil contempt, which is the disobeyance of a
court order designed to help the opposing party to the litigation; criminal contempt, which is the commission of a disrespectful act directed
against the court itself. There must be some combination of the above
classifications. The Supreme Court of California spoke only of direct or
indirect contempt and did not label whether it was civil or criminal.
Contempt is either direct civil or direct criminal, or indirect civil or
indirect criminal.
All states agree that the absence or tardiness of an attorney from the
courtroom at an appointed time may be punishable as criminal contempt.
The act of an attorney being absent from a courtroom goes to the very
heart of the definition of contempt; that is, a hindrance and obstruction
to the administration of justice. The courts differ, however, as to whether
such a situation is direct or indirect criminal contempt. Where an attorney's absence is considered as direct criminal contempt, punishment is
usually summary and immediate, and affidavits are not necessary. Indirect
criminal contempt is punishable only after the charge is made (the most
common means is by affidavits), and the accused has an opportunity to be
heard and to offer an explanation. If the Court accepts the explanation, the
7
accused will not be held in contempt.
The California Supreme Court decided that Arthur's conduct, his absence from the courtroom, constituted direct contempt, reasoning that
the defendant's absence was in the presence of the court. Although apparently much time was taken with the consideration of whether the
defendant's conduct amounted to direct or indirect contempt, no mention was made of whether this conduct amounted to civil or criminal
contempt. The failure of the attorney to be present in court, when he
has the ability to do so, is an obvious act of disrespect to the court and
would constitute criminal contempt.
The decision in the Arthur case represents the accepted view of the
State of California on the effect of an attorney's absence from the court6lId. at 510.

7 RAPALJE, CONTEMPT

26 (1887).
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room.8 The rationale underlying the holding in this case was that if the
court treated the defendant's acts as indirect contempt, the procedure
which would have been applied would "provide insulation to attorneys
who now overextend themselves and encourage them to go further in
trying the patience of trial judges through absences which obstruct normal courtroom procedure but border on being excusable."
Analysis of the California court decision reveals an inconsistency. The
court stated that the defendant's absence amounted to direct contempt
which is punishable summarily. However, the court held two hearings
to allow the defendant to give an explanation. The procedure followed
was quite similar to that required for indirect criminal contempt, and the
defendant was not formally held in contempt until his explanation was
deemed unsatisfactory.
People v. McDonnell,'° the most recent Illinois case on contempt of
court due to attorney's absence from the courtroom, is representative
of the view of all jurisdictions except California and New Jersey. McDonnell, an attorney, absented himself from a murder trial in which he
represented the defendant. He alleged that he had to attend a civil proceeding in another court. Because of his absence, the criminal proceeding was declared a mistrial, and upon his being cited for contempt, the
attorney's explanation was that he felt ill and that he suffered from nervousness, insomnia and amnesia." This explanation was not considered
a satisfactory excuse, and the contempt charge was upheld. The Illinois
court held that the attorney's absence constituted indirect contempt.
The attorney's act of appearing in another courtroom was not in the
presence of the court which was trying the criminal proceeding.'2
Until 1956, Ohio considered an attorney's absence from the courtroom
as direct contempt. 18 However, the decision in Weinland v. Industrial
8Chula v. Supreme Court, 57 Cal. 2d 199, 18 Cal. Rptr. 507, 368 P.2d 107 (1962);

Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 755, 278 P.2d 681 (1955).
9 Arthur v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 42 Cal. Rptr. 441, 445, 398
P.2d 777, 781 (1965). Accord, Re Clawans, 69 N.J. Super. 373, 174 A.2d 367 (1961); Vincent v. Vincent, 108 N.J. Eq. 136, 154 At. 328 (1931).
11 Ibid.
10 307 Ill. App. 368, 30 N.E.2d 80 (1940).
12 Among other states in accord with Illinois on contempt of court due to attorney's
absence are: Lee v. Bauer, 79 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1954); Re McHugh, 152 Mich. 505, 116
N.W. 459 (1908); Re Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S.W. 990 (1907); Re Walker, 275 App.
Div. 688, 86 N.Y.S.2d 726, aff'd. 299 N.Y. 686, 87 N.E.2d 71 (1949); Levine Contempt
Case, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222, cert. denied 346 U.S. 858 (1953); Ex Parte Hill, 122 Tex.
80, 52 S.W.2d 367 (1932); State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 Pac. 793 (1928);
Wise v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 779, 34 S.E. 453 (1899).
13

Previously, Ohio held that an attorney's unauthorized absence from the courtroom

constituted direct contempt. Ex rel Shroder v. Shay, 3 Ohio N..
Dec. 446 (1906).

(n.s.) 657, 16 Ohio
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Com.11 placed Ohio with the majority of jurisdictions in holding that
an attorney's absence from the courtroom constitutes indirect contempt.
Previous support for the "direct criminal contempt" approach was based

on Univis Lens Co. v. United E.R. and M.W., 15 where it was held that in
the presence of the court is more than merely physical presence.
If the act is of such character .. .that naturally its effect would be felt in the
actual administration of justice, then the act is as much done in the court's
presence as if the person doing it were actually in the court's presence. 16
In the Weinland case, an attorney experienced mechanical difficulty
with his automobile while driving to the courtroom where he was to
appear at 9:30 A.M. The attorney telephoned the court that he would
arrive by 10:00 A.M., but he did not appear until 10:10 A.M. He was held
in contempt of court and fined $100.00. On appeal, the Supreme Court
held that "if the [attorney] was guilty of contempt, only a portion of
the offense was direct and in the presence of the court, namely, entering
the court late and after the trial had started. ' 17 Since part of the alleged
misconduct occurred on the highway, it was not in or near the presence
of the court, and it was therefore in the nature of an indirect criminal
contempt for which the attorney was entitled to give an explanation.' 8
All jurisdictions hold that an attorney's absence from a courtroom may
constitute contempt. The vast majority of states label such conduct indirect contempt. The attorney is cited for contempt and is given an
opportunity to explain his absence before the contempt order is final.
In the instant case, the attorney's conduct was labeled direct contempt.
The only apparent difference in the instant case and in similar cases
in the majority of jurisdictions is the label attached to the attorney's
conduct. The procedure followed in all jurisdictions is very similar.

HowardFrank
14 166 Ohio St. 62, 139 N.E.2d 36 (1956). The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the
decision of the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of Appeals for Muskingin County,
both of which held that an attorney's absence or tardiness constituted direct criminal
contempt, which is punishable summarily.
15 86 Ohio App. 241, 89 N.E.2d 658 (1949).
16 Id. at 246, 89 N.E.2d at 661.
17 Weinland v. Industrial Coin., 166 Ohio St. 62, 66, 139 N.E.2d 36, 39 (1956).
18 Accord, District Attorney of Alamosa County v. District Court of Alamosa County,
150 Colo. 136, 371 P.2d 271 (1962). Colorado is the only other state along with Ohio
which reasons that an attorney's absence has elements of both direct and indirect
criminal contempt. Both Ohio and Colorado hold that the absence is in the presence
of the court, but the reason for the absence is not in the court's presence, and therefore
the contempt is not direct and cannot be punished summarily.

